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T

he Indian gaming landscape has developed
in unexpected ways in the past thirty years. One
development is the robust relationship between
tribal governments and state governments that was
spawned by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(IGRA)1 and its requirement for tribal-state compacts for Class III gaming.2 Few could have anticipated the development of such rich relationships, in
which tribes regularly negotiate with states and
sometimes wield tremendous power in state capitols. In some states, the governor has authority to
negotiate and sign compacts.3 In others, the governor may have the authority only to negotiate, but
ratification must occur through the state legislative
process.4 And there are other variations as well.5
Achieving agreement between a state and a tribe,
and then achieving ratification of that agreement
through state and tribal legislative processes, are
challenging endeavors. In part because of these
challenges and the increasing complexity and sophistication of the negotiations between tribes and
states, the parties negotiating gaming compacts
sometimes lose sight of an important legal requirement, namely, federal review of the final tribal-state
compact at the Department of the Interior (‘‘Department’’ or ‘‘Interior’’).
Failing to account for the need for federal approval
can undermine the entire negotiation process. Since
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1998, the Department has disapproved at least 20
compacts. A disapproval can be disastrous, undermining months or years of negotiation and, at a minimum,
returning the parties to the negotiation table. The purpose of this article is to highlight several recurring
problem areas that can place compact approval at
risk. These include the requirement in IGRA that a
compact avoid issues that are not germane to gaming,
that the compact avoid regulating Class II gaming,
which is beyond state authority, and the requirement
that the state avoid expanding its reach over ancillary
services and spaces that are not used for gaming.

EXPLANATION OF THE PROBLEM
A recent example is the compact between the
Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe of Massachusetts and
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. After months
of negotiation,6 the Mashpee Tribe and the governor
of Massachusetts reached a deal that was ratified by
the state legislature on July 26, 2012, and then
signed by the governor and the tribe on July 30,
2012.7 After celebration of the culmination of the

1
Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467–2486 (Oct. 17, 1988),
codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710–2721 (hereinafter IGRA).
2
Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Law, State Policy, and Indian
Gaming, 4 Nev. L.J. 285 (2003–2004).
3
See, e.g., Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 14.035 (2015).
4
See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code § 12012.25(d) (2015).
5
See generally Kevin K. Washburn, Recurring Problems in Indian Gaming, 1 Wyo. L. Rev. 427 (2001).
6
Gale C. Toensing, Massachusetts Governor Signs Mashpee
Gaming Compact, Indian Country Today Media Network
( July 31, 2012), <http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/
2012/07/31/massachusets-governor-signs-mashpee-gamingcompact-126809>.
7
Mark Arsenault, State’s Take May Doom Casino Deal, Boston Globe, July 29, 2012, <https://www.bostonglobe.com/
metro/2012/07/28/mashpee-wampanoag-tribal-compact-maytoo-generous-state-risking-federal-rejection/e4aeZgSkOIuhM7M
hcI5Z1L/story.html>.
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deal, the compact was sent to Interior, where it was
disapproved less than two and a half months later.8
The October 2012 disapproval sent the parties back
to the negotiation table, and it took more than a year
for the compact to be renegotiated, ratified by the
legislature, and returned to the Department for review. The new compact was approved in January
of 2014.9 While the Mashpee compact episode ultimately had a happy ending, the disapproval caused
uncertainty for more than 14 months.
In the world of Indian gaming, even a mere delay
can have profoundly negative effects. Investors in a
casino development may get frustrated and walk
away, causing finance options for the tribe to change
dramatically. State and tribal political leadership
can change, disrupting the course of negotiations
and the level of commitment to a gaming initiative.
Market conditions can change. In routine compact
negotiations, millions of dollars in gaming revenue
for tribes and revenue-sharing for state governments
hang in the balance. It is in the interest of both the
state and the tribe to avoid a disapproval.
Federal officials have worried for years that federal interests are not adequately considered in the
compact negotiation process. In 2002, then-Secretary
Gale Norton complained that ‘‘the Department receives a compact that is a fait accompli without
much opportunity for the Department to express its
policy views[.]’’10 Understanding of the issues at
play in federal review can be gleaned from hundreds
of compact review letters and those issues have
evolved over time.
The first compacts approved by the Department
were negotiated in 1989 and approved in 1990 between the State of Minnesota and Sioux tribes and
Ojibwe bands.11 By the fall of 1997, the Department
had approved more than 160 compacts.12 Since
1998, the Department has reviewed more than 500
compacts.13 It has disapproved at least 20 and
expressed concern about more than 60, as reflected
in ‘‘deemed approved’’ letters. Taken together, the
Department’s more than 660 decision letters reflect
wide contours in gaming compact approvals, and
several themes emerge from review of the disapprovals and ‘‘deemed approvals.’’
In reviewing these issues, it is apparent that compact disapprovals can be avoided through thoughtful
consideration of federal interests before compacts
are finalized. Planning for federal review and approval, however, is easier said than done. Compact
negotiations are fluid and organic; new issues can
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arise in any negotiation. Moreover, federal interpretations of the statutory14 and regulatory15 requirements
have not remained static; they have developed over
time. While all of the requirements are at least implicit in the statute and regulations, discretion and nuance play a role in interpretation by the Department.
As with any federal agency’s work, the contours of
the law can be gleaned from past decisions. The purpose of this brief article is to highlight some of the
recurring problems that impact compact approval
and offer guidance on avoiding terms in tribal-state
gaming compacts that can lead to disapproval.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR’S
AUTHORITY TO DISAPPROVE
The Department’s role in reviewing tribal-state
gaming compacts under IGRA is surprisingly
broad. IGRA authorizes the Secretary to disapprove
a compact if it violates IGRA, if it violates any other
federal law, or if it violates the trust obligations of
the United States to Indians.16 As explained more

8

Letter from Kevin K. Washburn, Assistant Secretary for Indian
Affairs, U.S. Department of the Interior, to Hon. Deval Patrick,
Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Oct. 12,
2012), 79 Fed. Reg. 6,213 (Feb. 13, 2014), available at
<http://www.indianaffairs.gov/cs/groups/webteam/documents/
text/idc1-028222.pdf>.
9
Letter from Kevin K. Washburn, Assistant Secretary for Indian
Affairs, U.S. Department of the Interior, to Hon. Cedric Cromwell, Chairperson Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe ( Jan. 6, 2014),
available at <http://www.indianaffairs.gov/cs/groups/webteam/
documents/document/idc1-028231.pdf>.
10
Letter from Gale A. Norton, United States Secretary of the Interior, to Hon. Cyrus Schindler, President of the Seneca Nation of Indians (Nov. 12, 2002), available at <http://www.indianaffairs
.gov/cs/groups/xoig/documents/text/idc-038394.pdf>.
11
Lower Sioux Community Reservation Compact with the State
of Minnesota, 55 Fed. Reg. 12,292 (Apr. 2, 1990), available at
<http://www.indianaffairs.gov/cs/groups/xoig/documents/text/
idc1-025919.pdf>.
12
Letter from Bruce Babbitt, United States Secretary of the Interior, to the Hon. Wendell Chino, President of the Mescalero
Apache Tribe (Aug. 23, 1997), available at <http://www.indian
affairs.gov/cs/groups/xoig/documents/text/idc-038382.pdf>.
13
Archive of Tribal-State Indian Gaming Compacts, Department of the Interior, Office of Indian Affairs, <http://
www.indianaffairs.gov/WhoWeAre/AS-IA/OIG/Compacts/index
.htm/> (last visited Feb. 25, 2016).
14
See IGRA, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721 (2015).
15
The Department has enacted regulations implementing
IGRA. 25 C.F.R. §§ 502.21–502.24 (2015).
16
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(B) (2015). The Secretary’s regulatory
role as to compacts under IGRA is codified at 25 C.F.R §§
293.1–293.16 (2015).
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fully below, the most common basis for disapproval
is the first: that is, that the compact is inconsistent
with IGRA.
Because it is not easy to articulate comprehensively the precise scope of ‘‘trust obligations of the
United States to Indians[,]’’ and perhaps because
interpreting the term in this context could have farreaching ramifications in decisions and litigation in
other areas, the Department has been reluctant to
use the ‘‘trust obligation’’ language as a basis for disapproval. Indeed, it appears that the Department has
never used that factor as the sole basis for disapproval.
However, it is sometimes mentioned as a source of
concern and perhaps a partial basis for disapproval.17

DYNAMICS OF NEGOTIATION
AND REVIEW
In the heat of negotiations between a tribe and a
state, it is perhaps easy to overlook the Department’s role because the Department is not a party
and because Washington, D.C., is far away. Parties
are likely to focus more on the iterative process of
negotiation and the particular political needs of
tribal and state political actors, with the agreement
developing into a document unique to the needs of
the parties. Absent some form of approval, however,
a compact is not valid. Thus, it is exceedingly important for the parties to consider the requirements
for federal approval during their negotiations.
A complicating factor for Department review is
the tight deadline for decision. Under IGRA, Interior has only 45 days to make a decision on a gaming compact once it is submitted for review.18
Moreover, the Department’s Office of Indian Gaming frequently asks the parties for additional information to help the Department conduct its analysis
after the 45-day review period has begun. One proactive step for the parties to consider is jointly
requesting a meeting with Department staff before
the agreement is finalized or ratified or signed. If
the parties brief the Department on the contours of
the proposed compact, staff can highlight potential
areas of concern. The opportunity for informal guidance from the Department has long been available.
In 2002, Secretary Norton implored parties to use
this informal process to avoid placing the Department, and the parties, in a tough position.19 While
the gaming staff at the Department usually will decline to issue any sort of pre-approval in deference

to the fact that they are not the final decision makers, the staff can be helpful in highlighting obvious
issues for the parties. This process may even be used
occasionally as a negotiation tactic. Such a meeting
is not only for the benefit of the parties: a meeting
can give comfort to the federal staff, who will not
have much time to review the compact when it is ultimately submitted.
The most obvious decision options by the Department are approval or disapproval. However, IGRA
also provides that a compact not approved within
45 days of receipt by the Department is considered
approved, but only to the extent that it is consistent
with law. The 45-day provision presumably is a
decision-forcing mechanism. However, it has given
rise to a curious practice at the Department and effectively created a third path for the Department. It
works as follows. Sometimes, the Department declines to issue an approval because of concerns
with a compact; however, it also declines to issue
an affirmative disapproval. In those instances, the
compact is approved by operation of law. However—
and this is the unusual part—the Department sometimes issues a letter contemporaneously with the
expiration of the 45-day period or shortly thereafter,
explaining its concerns about the compact. Thus, in
practice, the Department has three options when it reviews a gaming compact: approval, disapproval, or
‘‘deemed approval’’ with or without comment.
Why would the Department decline to take affirmative action of either approval or disapproval? As
noted above, a compact often reflects the culmination
of months or years of negotiation and significant legislative and executive processes within state and
tribal sovereign governments. A disapproval is likely

17

See, e.g., Letter from Kevin K. Washburn to Hon. Deval Patrick, supra note 8 (noting that compact provision involving
state-tribal agreement to revolve hunting and fishing right
‘‘may violate the United States trust obligation to Indians’’).
Cf. Letter from Donald Laverdure, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Indian Affairs, U.S. Department of the Interior,
to Hon. Kimberly M. Vele, President, Stockbridge-Munsee
Community of Mohican Indians (Feb. 11, 2011), available at
<www.indianaffairs.gov/cs/groups/xoig/documents/text/idc1024497.pdf> (compact provisions requiring trust lands to be
used only for gaming impermissible).
18
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(c). This requirement is codified at 25
C.F.R §§ 293.10–293.12 (2015). It is also important to remember that the Department’s time runs not from the time of signing, but from the time it is submitted to the Department’s
office of Indian Gaming for review. See 25 C.F.R. § 293.9.
19
Letter from Gale A. Norton to the Hon. Cyrus Schindler,
supra note 10, at 2 n.1.
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to be a major disappointment to the tribe, which may
have developed significant plans and investment
around the expectation of an approved compact.
The Department generally owes a trust responsibility
to tribes, and Department officials understand, better
than almost anyone other than tribal leaders themselves, the importance of strong tribal economic development. Often, disapproval may be the best
course for national policy, but it is likely to have
short-term negative effects for the tribe whose compact was disapproved. Likewise, compact disapproval will likely disappoint the state that has
entered the compact, which may be expecting revenue sharing or other benefits through the compact.
As a result, the Department is loath to disapprove
compacts. Moreover, powerful external political
forces are often brought to bear to discourage the
Department from issuing disapproval.
On the other hand, there are often items in compacts that give the Department significant concern.
While the Department is loath to issue a disapproval,
the Department may also wish to avoid providing
a stamp of approval to terms in a compact that
are problematic or potentially problematic. The
‘‘deemed approval’’ approach allows the parties to
move forward with Class III gaming, but it preserves
the legal issue for a potential showdown in the courts
or an arbitration proceeding at a later date.20 As a
practical matter, the ‘‘deemed approval’’ approach allows the compact to take effect, but withholds the
Department’s endorsement of problematic terms.
A ‘‘deemed approval’’ generally occurs in three
broad circumstances. First, the terms of concern in
a compact may be ambiguous. In that circumstance,
the Department can express its views as to the lawful interpretation of the terms and express an expectation that the ambiguous terms will be applied in a
lawful manner.21
Second, the Department may have concerns
about a term, but it may be unlikely that facts making that term material would actually occur in the
real world. Thus, the term may be theoretically
problematic, but practically irrelevant. For example,
a compact may require that a tribe provide the state
a revenue share of 25 percent of net gaming revenue
above a certain annual threshold, such as $1 billion
dollars. This percentage might be thought by the
Department to be far too high. However, if the gaming operation’s annual revenues are currently below
$100 million, the Department might find that the
term is not likely to ever become operable.22
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Finally, the Department may issue a ‘‘deemed approval’’ if the compact is generally positive for the
tribe and it contains only a single serious issue of
concern, or a few minor issues. For example, a
tribe’s new compact, despite the Department’s concerns, may objectively be a marked improvement
across a wide range of subjects over the tribe’s existing compact. In rare cases like this, the Department
may issue a ‘‘deemed approval’’ so as not to ‘‘let the
perfect be the enemy of the good.’’23
As the compact approval process has developed,
a number of issues have arisen over and over. This
article will now turn to the Department’s ‘‘repeat
offenders’’—that is, problematic provisions that
seem to appear often in compacts submitted to the
Department for approval.

REQUIREMENT THAT TERMS
IN COMPACTS BE GERMANE
TO CLASS III GAMING
Serious concerns can arise when a compact attempts to resolve matters utterly unrelated to the
gaming activity. In general, it is understandable
why the temptation exists to address such matters.
Tribal and state governments have numerous issues
of mutual concern, some of which produce conflict.
These include boundary disputes, land rights or
claims, hunting and fishing rights, water rights,

20
The complex and time-intensive nature of compact negotiations may also counsel the inclusion of a severability clause
that would permit a compact to be approved even if a discrete
provision is deemed to violate IGRA. While the Department
does not have explicit independent authority to strike offensive
provisions and render an affirmative approval, the parties can
effectively provide such authority in the terms of the compact.
See, e.g., Kialagee Tribal Town Compact with the State of Oklahoma, at § 15D ( July 8, 2011), available at <http://www
.indianaffairs.gov/cs/groups/xoig/documents/text/idc1-024687.pdf>.
In the absence of the parties providing this authority, the
Department can accomplish a similar result by calling out the
troubling provision in a deemed approval letter.
21
Jicarilla Apache Nation, Deemed Approved Letter, Tribal State
Gaming Compact, 80 Fed. Reg. 35,668 ( June 22, 2015), available
at <http://www.indianaffairs.gov/cs/groups/xoig/documents/
text/idc1-031301.pdf>.
22
Karuk Tribe, Deemed Approved Letter, Tribal State Gaming
Compact, 79 Fed. Reg. 68,910 (Nov. 19, 2014), available at
<http://www.indianaffairs.gov/cs/groups/xoig/documents/text/
idc1-028626.pdf>.
23
Francios Marie Arouet (Voltaire), Dictionnaire Philosophique Portatif (1764), reprinted in Concise Oxford Dictionary of Quotations 797 (Susan Ratcliffe ed., 6th ed., 2011).
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and tax disputes, among others. The natural tendency may be to address them along with gaming issues in gaming compact negotiations, especially if
those negotiations are proceeding productively.
While gaming compact negotiations may provide
a convenient opportunity to address such issues,
the Department has begun to look much more critically at such provisions when they are found in
compacts. For reasons explained more fully below,
compact provisions related to non-gaming matters
are usually illegal. Thus, states and tribes should
be cautious about addressing non-gaming issues
within the gaming compact.
In IGRA, Congress carefully created a regulatory
scheme with distinct roles for the various sovereign
governments involved. Class I gaming is regulated exclusively by Indian tribal governments; Class II gaming is regulated primarily by tribal governments in
cooperation with the federal government; and, Class
III gaming is regulated primarily by tribal governments and, to the extent negotiated in an approved
compact, a state government. In addition to assigning
these regulatory opportunities for classes of gaming to
specific governments, Congress clearly and explicitly
limited the scope of negotiations regarding the gaming compact.24 IGRA explicitly identifies six subjects
that parties may negotiate, and a seventh subject, the
so-called ‘‘catchall.’’ The lawful subjects of negotiation include (1) criminal and civil laws ‘‘related to,
and necessary for’’ the licensing and regulation of
gaming; (2) allocation of jurisdiction necessary to enforce gaming laws; (3) assessments by the state to defray costs of regulating gaming activity; (4) tribal
taxation in amounts comparable to state taxation
for similar activities; (5) remedies for breach of contract; and (6) standards for the operation of gaming
and maintenance of the gaming facility.25 The seventh
category of proper subjects for negotiation includes
‘‘any other subjects that are directly related to the operation of gaming.’’26 In sum, Congress mandated
that the lawful scope of gaming compacts—and
thus, presumably, compact negotiations—be limited
to the six matters explicitly named and any other subject ‘‘directly related’’ to gaming.
The basic legal theory for the limitation on subjects addressed in compacts is expressio unius, or
for those who appreciate completeness, expressio
unius est exclusio alterius. By clearly, thoroughly,
and explicitly identifying the subjects that can be
addressed in a compact, Congress presumably
intended to limit compacts to those subjects. As dis-
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cussed below, IGRA contains other provisions that
support this theory. For example, IGRA requires
states to negotiate with tribes in good faith.27 The
limitation on subject matter gives meaning to what
constitutes good faith. Second, Congress carefully
limited state authority to issues dealing with Class
III gaming and explicitly provided no state role in
Class I and II gaming.28
Why would Congress limit the subjects to be included in a Class III gaming compact? A clear message that comes through in the legislative history is
that Congress sought to prevent a state from using
its right to compact negotiation to extend state authority beyond gaming. This would presumably include using that authority to force resolution of
other issues, unrelated to gaming. The very real concern is that a state may use its leverage over Class III
gaming to exact a favorable resolution of issues unrelated to Class III gaming.29 Put more bluntly, because an approved gaming compact is a legal
requirement for Class III gaming, a state could withhold negotiation or consent in an effort to address
matters not related to gaming, thus holding Indian
gaming hostage to other demands.
While the temptation for state negotiators to bootstrap may be high, the actual need for state authority
over such matters is low. Across a range of examples,
the issues presented simply do not address the unique
concerns raised by states related to the risks of gaming. Thus, justification for addressing such matters in
a gaming compact is lacking.
Examples of including matters unrelated to gaming abound. In a tribal state compact in Oklahoma,
the State of Oklahoma negotiated the right to terminate the gaming compact if there was a material
breach by the tribe of the terms of a separate tobacco compact.30 In a California gaming compact, the
parties sought to create state jurisdiction over food

24

25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(B) and (C)(i)–(vii) (2015).
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(i)–(vi) (2015).
26
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(vii) (2015) (emphasis added).
27
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
28
Compare 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a) and (b) with 25 U.S.C. §
2710(d).
29
See, e.g., Sen. Rep. No. 100-446 on the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, to accompany S. 555, at 10, 14, including additional views of Mr. McCain, at 34 (1988).
30
Letter from Larry Echo Hawk, Assistant Secretary for Indian
Affairs, U.S. Department of the Interior, to Hon. Tiger Hobia,
Mekko, Kialegee Tribal Town ( July 8, 2011), available at
<http://www.indianaffairs.gov/cs/groups/xoig/documents/text/
idc1-024687.pdf>.
25
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and beverage services at the casino and drinking
water quality on the reservation. The Department
noted that ‘‘the Tribe’s provision of food, beverages,
and drinking water to its patrons may occur on the
same parcel [of land] on which it conducts class III
gaming, [but] it does not . follow that it is ‘‘directly
related [to gaming] under IGRA.’’31 The Department
determined that this term was ‘‘inconsistent’’ with
IGRA, but avoided disapproval of the agreement; it
allowed the compact to be deemed approved.
Another example appeared in the initial Mashpee
Wampanoag compact with the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts.32 In this compact, which was disapproved, the compact listed the governor’s and Commonwealth’s consideration of the resolution of
important issues related to ‘‘hunting, fishing, and
land use’’ as part of the exchange that justified
state revenue sharing. When pressed, the tribe admitted that it had requested the language ‘‘in an effort to
resolve longstanding issue between the tribe and the
state.’’ The Department’s disapproval was clear, however: ‘‘the Tribe’s hunting and fishing rights cannot
be placed upon the bargaining table when it negotiates a [gaming compact].’’33
These limitations are not of recent vintage. Secretary Norton raised concerns about attempts to address issues not germane to gaming in a 2002
decision letter.34 In that case, the State of New
York had negotiated a term in the compact that required the Seneca Nation of Indians to use all of
its remaining settlement funds for the purposes of
housing only. While an objective reading of the provision would suggest that it was an attempt to prevent the tribe from using its settlement funds to
purchase additional lands on which it could engage
in gaming, the Department criticized the provision.
The Department found ‘‘tenuous’’ the tribe’s claim
that the provision was directly related to gaming because the primary purpose of the provision was to
allow the tribe to acquire land next to the gaming facility. Ultimately, despite a number of problems
highlighted by Secretary Norton, the compact was
deemed approved, leaving the legality of some of
the terms for another day.
One might find it curious that, in the Mashpee
case, for example, the Department issued the disapproval even though the tribe affirmatively wished to
include the non-gaming subject in gaming compact
negotiations. From the Department’s standpoint,
however, IGRA creates a relatively bright line
about what can be addressed in a compact and,
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from a policy point of view, preserving that bright
line is important. Otherwise, a tribe might be required to negotiate issues, perhaps even under duress, because the state insisted.
In light of the clear guidance from Congress in
IGRA and increasing scrutiny on these issues from
Interior, a compact that includes unauthorized subjects may well be disapproved. Thus, the parties negotiating compacts should avoid the inclusion of
provisions not directly related to the operation of
Class III gaming activities.

REQUIREMENT TO AVOID REGULATING
CLASS II GAMING
Another issue that can arise in compact negotiations is Class II gaming. Some forms of electronic
Class II games, played in video gaming cabinets,
look similar to Class III slot machines. Such Class
II gaming machines are sometimes known as
‘‘Class 2.9’’ games. Despite the colloquial label,
such Class II gaming is clearly lawful under
IGRA and is legally distinct from Class III gaming.
The right of tribes to offer such games was clearly
established through extensive litigation that began
in the district courts in the 1990s and produced appellate decisions upholding the right in four different circuit courts in the early 2000s.35
31
Letter from Donald E. Laverdure, Acting Assistant Secretary
for Indian Affairs, U.S. Department of the Interior, Department
of the Interior, to the Hon. Greg Sarris, Chairman, Federated Indians of the Graton Rancheria ( July 13, 2012) at 11, available
at <http://www.indianaffairs.gov/cs/groups/xoig/documents/
text/idc1-026885.pdf>.
32
See, e.g., Mashpee Wampanoag Compact with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Oct. 12, 2012), available at <http://
www.indianaffairs.gov/cs/groups/webteam/documents/text/
idc1-028222.pdf>.
33
Letter from Kevin K. Washburn, Supra note 8.
34
Letter from Gale A. Norton to the Hon. Cyrus Schindler,
supra note 10, at 7.
35
See, e.g., Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Okla. v. Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n, 327 F.3d 1019 (10th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540
U.S. 1218 (2004); United States v. Santee Sioux Tribe of Neb.,
324 F.3d 607 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1229
(2004); United States v. 162 Mega-Mania Gambling Devices,
231 F.3d 713 (10th Cir. 2000); Diamond Game Enterprises v.
Reno, 230 F.3d 365 (D.C. Cir. 2000); United States v. 103 Electronic Gambling Devices, 223 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2000). For
more discussion of the broader context, see Kevin K. Washburn,
Agency Culture and Conflict: Federal Implementation of the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act by the National Indian Gaming
Commission, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Department
of Justice, 42 Ariz. St. L.J. 303 (2010).
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The existence of Class II (and Class 2.9) gaming is
exceedingly important to tribes for at least two reasons.
First, especially in light of the Seminole Tribe36 decision, which undermined tribes’ ability to sue states for
failing to negotiate compacts in good faith, the existence of electronic Class II gaming insures that a
tribe can offer some forms of cabinet-based video
gaming even in a state that refuses to negotiate a
Class III gaming compact.37 Second, even for tribes
that have approved tribal-state Class III gaming compacts, Class II gaming may be valuable. Class II gaming machines are not subject to limits on the quantity
of slot machines, restrictions which exist in some
compacts,38 and the revenues from Class II gaming
are not subject to revenue sharing with the state.
For the same reasons that Class II gaming is an
important resource for tribes, states may be upset
by Class II gaming and sometimes are inclined to
seek to address Class II gaming in gaming compacts. For example, in a 2007 compact with the
State of Florida, the Seminole Tribe agreed to convert 80 percent of its Class II video bingo terminals
to Class III slot machines and further agreed not to
lease any new Class II machines, apparently so that
the state could be assured of more revenue through
its revenue sharing terms.39
For a variety of reasons, Class II gaming is not an
authorized subject of negotiation for compacts. The
context of compact requirements discussed above
indicates that the gaming compacts requirement
applies only to Class III gaming, not Class II.40
Moreover, the regulation of Class II gaming was reserved for tribal and federal regulation.41
In part, the tribe’s immunity from state involvement in Class II gaming was a political compromise.
At the time of the enactment of IGRA in 1988, the
Cabazon decision of 198742 had clarified that states
had very limited jurisdiction over tribal bingo activities. Following Cabazon, tribes seemed to have the
unfettered right to engage in bingo, which Congress
later classified as Class II gaming, in any state in
which bingo was lawful for any purpose. The congressional authors of IGRA presumably hoped for
tribal support of its passage. Yet, as a political matter, tribes were highly unlikely to support legislation
that rolled back rights that they felt they had already
won in Cabazon. As a result, Congress recognized
existing gains by tribes and exempted Class II gaming from any compact requirement.43
To be sure, the Department has allowed the bright
line between state authority over Class II and Class
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III gaming to become blurred through rare approvals
or ‘‘deemed approvals’’ of gaming compacts containing limitations on Class II gaming. However, the inclusion of such provisions gives rise to the fear that a state
government may well have leveraged its congressionally authorized power to negotiate over Class III matters to gain influence over Class II gaming, which is
properly beyond state reach. Insuring that negotiations
between tribes and states are conducted on a good faith
and fair basis is one of the reasons for the Department’s approval role. The Department’s acquiescence
on this issue in rare cases should not be viewed as approval of the inclusion of Class II terms in Class III
gaming compacts. The Department has begun to examine these issues much more closely in recent
years. As a result, including such provisions in a compact places the compact at risk of disapproval.

AVOIDING STATE EFFORTS
TO EXERCISE AUTHORITY OVER
ANCILLARY ACTIVITIES AND SPACES
Another issue that frequently arises is casinorelated, but not gaming-related, amenities. Most
gaming operations have additional amenities that
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RECURRING ISSUES IN INDIAN GAMING COMPACT APPROVAL

are connected in a business sense to the casino operation and are co-located with a casino, but do
not themselves constitute gaming. These range
from a simple snack shop, at the modest end, to a
full resort with swimming pools, golf courses, hotels, and often multiple restaurants. Such ancillary
activities may also include spas, concert venues,
conference centers, and even RV parks.
Through the compact process, states have sometimes sought to expand the power that they can exercise over gaming to reach other activities beyond
gaming and physical spaces beyond the casino floor.
One way this occurs is through exceedingly broad
definitions in compacts of the term ‘‘gaming facilities’’ or other definitions of the physical spaces that
are subject to state regulation.
State regulation of commercial gaming in the
United States and federal regulation governed by
IGRA is premised, at least in part, on the notion that
gaming activities pose unique risks not presented by
golf courses, swimming pools, hotels, restaurants,
spas, concert venues, RV parks, or conference centers.
At the time IGRA was enacted, gaming was primarily
a cash business with a high volume of transactions,
sometimes involving large sums of money.44 Most
of the perceived risks were related to the cashintensive nature of the business, such as theft, corruption, money laundering, and other potential wrongs.
Moreover, back then, the industry still had the taint
of organized crime. Another risk, unique to gaming,
is compulsive or ‘‘pathological’’ gambling.
Like Nevada, Congress adopted a background investigation and personal licensure regime in IGRA
for gaming employees. This kind of regime, now
used in some manner in every jurisdiction with legalized gaming, involves intrusive background investigations with the level of scrutiny correlated directly
to the employee’s ability to exploit the casino’s vulnerabilities. For example, managers, dealers, and
employees who work in the cage or the count room
have historically been perceived to present a greater
risk to the casino and consequently earn more rigorous scrutiny in background investigations than, for
example, food and beverage wait staff, who lack significant access to sensitive areas or resources but are
physically located on the gaming floor.
In IGRA, Congress was interested in insuring rigorous regulation in light of the unique risks posed by
gaming enterprises. Under general principles of Indian law, states generally lack regulatory authority
over ordinary activities conducted by tribes and In-
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dian people on tribal lands.45 Indeed, in some ways,
reservations are properly viewed as sanctuaries for
tribal governments from state authority. Congress
created the compact negotiation process to give a
state the opportunity to address its unique and legitimate regulatory concerns about gambling activities
that involve state citizens and occur within the
boundaries of a state.
The compact process, as noted above, was not
created to allow state authorities to encroach on
tribal sovereignty as to other subjects that do not
pose the unique risks of gaming. If the state lacks
authority to regulate a tribal business activity in
the absence of a casino, it may not gain authority
over such activity by virtue of the tribe’s decision
to pursue Class III gaming.
Rarely do any of the ancillary activities pose the
kind of risks that Congress enabled states to address
in Class III gaming compacts. Indeed, while swimming pools pose serious risks to life and health, regulating the risks posed by swimming pools was not
what Congress sought to accomplish in IGRA.
The ancillary activities issue has become more salient in recent years, as the Department has repeatedly
expressed concerns about the issue.46 It has been litigated to a final decision in at least one instance, in a
compact arbitration between the State of Arizona and
the Pascua Yaqui Tribe. In that case, the state sought
to apply its compact regulatory scheme to the tribal
hotel, characterizing the hotel as a ‘‘gaming facility’’
because it was physically connected to the casino.
The compact gave regulators a virtually unfettered
right to enter gaming spaces. The tribe argued, successfully, that such an approach is sensible when regulating gaming spaces, which involve frequent large
cash transactions. The tribe argued, however, that this
approach was entirely inappropriate as to hotel guest
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rooms, where patrons have a legitimate right to privacy recognized—and protected—by the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
The arbitrators agreed with the tribe, clarifying that
the state’s gaming regulatory powers do not reach
the hotel attached to the casino.47
Increasingly, the Department has expressed concern when a compact attempts to sweep ancillary
activities or spaces into the realm of state regulation
under a gaming compact. Efforts to use a gaming
compact to extend state authority over such activities places a compact at risk of disapproval.
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CONCLUSION
The Department is loath to disapprove a tribalstate gaming compact, but it has asserted itself
more and more in recent years as issues of concern
arise. Because of the difficulty of negotiating (and
sometimes ratifying) a compact, state and tribal negotiators should think carefully about the reception
the compact will receive at the Department. States
and tribes negotiating compacts can avoid significant risk to compact approval by avoiding the common problems mentioned above.
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